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When it comes to the meaning of ethnicity concerning the current Afghan War different 
opinions collide. On one hand, there are numerous journalists (e.g. RASHID 2000) and 
researchers (e.g. RIECK 1997) as well as policy-makers such as Colin Powell or Joschka 
Fischer who categorise the Afghan conflict as an ethnic one. On the other hand, the majority 
of Afghan politicians – in spite or just because of their different ethnic backgrounds – deny 
the importance of ethnicity in public. Against this background I intend to discuss in this paper 
the perception of ethnic groups by the Afghan people as well as the significance of ethnic 
groups regarding the design of a future government in Afghanistan.  
Deriving from the perception that ethnicity is the predominant argument in the Afghan War, 
the peace process that was initiated at the Petersberg Conference near Bonn end of November 
2001 is based on an ethnic representative government. Thus in consequence it is nowadays 
nearly impossible to fade out the ethnic affiliation of any political actors. In full contrast to 
this approach I highly suggest that the rebuilding of political institutions should endeavor to 
diminish the influence of ethnicity in the political sphere. The implementation of an ethno-
federalism as well as the introduction of an ethnic quota system would rather intensify the 
highly fragile conflict situation rather than contribute to a stable peace. My central argument 
is that ethnic groups can not be considered as the predominant references of solidarity in 
Afghanistan. It has to be kept in mind that an ethnicization of the Afghan War occurred, but 
an ethnicization of the masses failed. The still not domineering importance that ethnicity has 
among the Afghan populace should be harnessed for political reconstruction, rather than being 
enforced by an ‘ethnical solution’.  
 
2.  The chimera of ethnic groups 
The dilemma with including ethnicity into a peace approach begins with the question of what 
constitutes an ethnic group. Already the controversy about the definition of ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘ethnic groups’ in the academic world is extremely intense. Regarding Afghanistan most 
researchers have the view that ethnic groups have existed since time immemorial. They 
assume that ethnic groups are solid cultural units which are divided by obvious boundaries 
and have engaged in conflict for hundreds of years (e.g. SHAHRANI 1986: 26-29). Set against 
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this opinion, this paper argues that most of those ethnic groups in Afghanistan were shaped or 
even ‘created’ in the course of the 20th century and are still not the main references of identity 
in Afghanistan itself. 
 
2.1 Fuzziness of ethnic groups 
Reviewing the literature and reports of British agents, soldiers and explorers it is worth noting 
that the term ‘ethnic group’ was completely unknown in the 19th century and many authors 
used different categories and references in their endeavors to describe and define the 
population of Afghanistan. A good example of this fuzziness is Henry BELLEW’S report “The 
races of Afghanistan; being a brief account of the principal nations inhabiting the country”. 
Already in the title BELLEW equated ‘races’ and ‘nations’. Moreover he divided the 
inhabitants of Afghanistan into eight major groups, the Pathans [Pashtuns], Yusufzai, Afridi, 
Khattak, Daticae, Ghilji, Tajik and Hazara; most of these categories are today subsumed 
under the label of “Pashtuns”. 
Not until the mid-20th century did foreign academics and the government start to divide 
Afghan society systematically into ethnic categories by differences in language, sectarianism, 
culture etc. The French anthropologist DOLLOT (1937: 47) was the first researcher, who used 
the term groupe ethnique for Afghanistan and categorized the Afghan people in several ethnic 
units. WILBER (1956/1962) introduced the ethnic taxonomy of the Afghan people into the 
Anglophone literature in the mid-50s. Driven by the academic intention to eliminate the 
hybrid transition between once established ethnic groups by the creation of new groups 
according to cultural customs, anthropologists invented an entire series of ethnic groups: 
Nuristani, Pashai, Aimaq, Tajik, Mountain-Tajik or Farsiwan. Probably, the best example for 
the construction of these so-called ethnic groups is the creation of the Tajiks. The term Tajik, 
which was used in social interactions only in a negative sense for somebody who did not 
belong to any other social category (e.g. not a Pashtun, not a Hazara), implied an anti-ethnic 
notion in general. The ethnic category Tajiks applied to the residual group of all Sunnite 
Persian-speaking villagers or urban dwellers without tribal background, which meant to all 
those without a genealogical knowledge, and finally without a shared history. The lack of a 
belief in a shared past turned out to be the major obstacle concerning political attempts to 
establish a consciousness of being a Tajik and to create a real ethnic group of “Tajiks” again 
and again. Against this background the main difficulties of fixing ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan are still: 
• The segments of the populace for whom ethnic categories were invented are often 
even today not even familiar with such ethnic labels, much less aware of any common 
identity. Ismail Khan, one of the most important regional leaders, is sometimes 
considered to be a Tajik, a Pashtun or a Farsiwan. He himself steadily refuses to be 
assigned to a certain ethnic group. 
• The criteria, which have been set by anthropologists, do not correspond with the 
reality of social behavior. For example, those who maintain that Pashtuns speak 
Pashtu and are Sunni Muslims are in serious error, since there are also Shiite Pashtuns 
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in the Qandahar region and Pashtuns from Kabul who often do not speak a word of 
Pashtu. A good example of the aforementioned is the former king Zahir Shah.  
• The difficulties with differentiating are being aggravated by the fact that many 
Afghans – if they are mastering the cultural patterns – in different situations claim to 
be of different ethnicity. The former Afghan president Babrak Karmal used to 
emphasize his Pashtun origin, whereas many Afghans considered him to be a Tajik or 
an immigrated Kashmiri.  
Against this background it is impossible to calculate how many ethnic groups exist in 
Afghanistan and how large they are. Also it has to considered that the different scientific 
approaches of researchers result in different ways of ethnic categorizing. A German survey 
concludes there are about 54 ethnic groups (ORYWAL 1986), while a Soviet study (MASSON & 
ROMODIN 1964/65) claims there to be 200. Therefore the crucial problem emerges of which 
ethnic groups and to which scale are to be taken into consideration in an ‘ethnical solution’, as 
promoted by the United Nations. 
 
2.2 Instrumentalization of ethnicity 
The question comes to mind as to why ethnic groups rose to political relevance in 
Afghanistan. To answer this question one has to look back into history. The Afghan state was 
created by the rival colonial powers British India and Russia at the end of the 19th century. 
The ruling family of the Pashtuns, enthroned by British India, favored Pashtun elements in 
their concept of the nation-state. That is the reason why ‘Afghan’ is the Persian synonym for 
Pashtun, Pashtu was always the Afghan national language and the Afghan history was written 
from a Pashtun point of view. The politics of the ruling family employed the ethnic patterns 
which came into existence in order to regulate access to public goods and offices. Pashtuns 
were privileged in all areas and dominated the military. Tajiks were left with the economic 
sector and the educational institutions, whereas the Hazaras were marginalized in general. The 
different treatment of the people went along with the forming of ethnic stereotypes: Pashtuns 
were considered ‘bellicose’, Tajiks were said to be ‘thrifty’, Uzbeks were known as ‘brutal’ 
and the Hazaras as ‘illiterate’ and ‘poor’. Even though the politics of the nation-state thus 
created an ethnic hierarchy, there were surprisingly few ethnic conflicts. The main reason for 
this lack of conflicts was the enormous contrast between the rural and urban areas. Politics in 
the capital Kabul was of little interest for the people in rural Afghanistan. Thus the ethnic 
groups remained blurred concepts for the Afghan population and were not respected as 
frameworks for collective actions. Accordingly the ordinary Afghans did not articulate a 
political will to overcome the ethnic hierarchy stipulated by the state. Furthermore Afghans 
recognized the nation-state as a hostile factor which intervened by force into their social life 
and not as a key to the access to resources (such as offices or land rights) which they should 
take control of (see SCHETTER 2002). 
Ethnicity became a political-military force to reckon with when the Afghan war broke out in 
1979. Even though the war was dominated by the antagonism of communism versus Islam 
regarding the paradigms of the Cold War, the belligerent parties increasingly enhanced the 
ethnic momentum to strengthen their positions (ROY 1986). The communist rulers hoped to 
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tie certain ethnic groups closer to them by raising them to the status of nationalities 
(PSTRUSINSKA 1990). Even more important was the creation of militias that relied on ethnic 
affiliation; well-known is the Uzbek militia of Rashid Dostum. Also Pakistan and Iran used 
the ethnic potential for conflicts. On the grounds of Shiite loyalties Iran established the Hizb-i 
wahdat, which was strong amongst the Shiite Hazaras. During the 1980s the Jamiat-i islami, 
the oldest resistance movement, developed into a representation for the Tajiks. Pakistan 
supported the Taliban which followed a radical Islam but this was also Pashtun-dominated. 
All four warring factions, which dominated the military and political actions in the last 
decade, were more or less supported by members of one of the four major ethnic groups. The 
political movements used ethnicity as main argument for the legitimacy of their political 
existence, because all other ideologies – Islamic as well as communistic or royalist one – lost 
ground as a basis for the mobilization of the masses and as instrument of political demands. 
The leaders of the warring factions made their supporters aware of their social and economic 
deprivation on the basis of their ethnic belonging in past and present. They claimed at least 
that the survival of the ‘own ethnic group’ was endangered through the aggressive behavior of 
‘other ethnic groups’. Nevertheless, by means of the ethnic moment the warring factions 
stirred up a collective anxiety as well as hate and jealousy. Also, the parties demanded 
economic and political resources of the state and society in the name of their ethnic groups. 
Furthermore all warring factions justified their political demands referring to the size of their 
ethnic group and their territorial roots. In these efforts they frequently lost their sense of 
reality. Also all warring factions used ethnicity in their military actions. Ethnic cleansing and 
ethnocides occurred frequently in Kabul between 1992 and 1994, in the Shomali plains 
between 1996 and 2001, in the Hazarajat between 1998 and 2001 and in Northern 
Afghanistan, especially Mazar-i Sharif, since 1997. 
 
2.3 Limitation of ethnic propaganda 
However the ethnicization of the conflict was restricted with regard to one important aspect: 
The ethnic card was never played openly, but remained covert. Thus one can find very little 
proof of ethnocentrism among any of the political movements involved. No single political 
movement is linked to a certain ethnic group by its self-description. The published speeches 
of leaders such as Ahmad Shah Masud, Burhanuddin Rabbani or Mullah Omar, have been 
imbued with an Islamic rhetoric, but all of them vehemently denied any ethnic dimension of 
the war. All politicians never tire of declaring their respective parties as being multi-ethnic. 
The underlying reason is that Afghans refrain from picking ethnicity out as a central theme. 
Therefore it should be taken into consideration that ethnicity as a potential source of 
mobilization has been strictly limited. All warring parties used the ethnic moment rather in an 
undercover and strategic way. The reason is that there are serious barriers for a public 
emphasis of ethnicity: 
• First of all, a major value in Islam is the idea that all believers are part of a 
united community (ummah). The fragmentation of society along ethnic lines 
contrasts with the concept of ummah. That is why ethnocentric slogans are 
avoided in public and many Afghans consider the accentuation of ethnicity as 
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un-Islamic. Especially the parties which are rooted in the mujahidin movement 
of the 1970s/1980s strongly rejected any ethnic tensions in public. 
• Secondly, due to the resistance against the communist regime and the exile of 
many Afghans the identification of the Afghans with their country increased in 
the 1980s. The majority of Afghans support the continuance of the Afghan 
nation state. Against that, the fragmentation of Afghanistan implies an 
uncertain future. Through this fact the warring parties avoid questioning the 
integrity of the Afghan state. This means that their appeal for ethnicity is 
strategically very limited. There is a wide-ranging consensus amongst 
Afghans, that to bring forward arguments along ethnic lines will threaten the 
continued existence of the Afghan nation-state. Whoever claims rights in the 
name of an ethnic group is quickly considered a traitor. 
• Thirdly, the ethnic groups, which are involved in the Afghan struggle for 
power, are represented in the neighboring countries as well, with the exception 
of the Hazaras. If the Jamiat-i islami and the Jombish-i milli stress ethnicity, 
they will run the risk that their separation from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
becomes blurred. Also, these parties are not interested in the unification with 
these countries, because this could mean a limitation of their political freedom 
and their access to economic and social resources. The Taliban faced a 
different situation: Due to the influence of Pakistan on the Taliban, this 
movement was not able to turn to an obvious Pashtun ethno-nationalism. 
• Fourth and last, as long as the parties strive for central power, they had to 
demonstrate their ability to rule a multi-ethnic Afghanistan.  
I have tried to demonstrate that all parties, which have been influential in the last decade, are 
using ethnicity regarding a specific political demand. But the certain political and cultural 
situation in Afghanistan regulates and strictly limits the utilization of ethnicity as an 
instrument for political claims and military mobilization. 
 
2.4 The dominance of clientelism and the absence of a civil society 
Taking the limited importance of ethnicity into consideration the question arises as to what 
are the dominant frameworks of identity and action in Afghan society. In general it can be 
noted that Afghan society is based on small-scale communities and is characterized by a 
series of overlapping obligations of solidarity. This means that groups are formed less along 
interests but more along family and kinship networks. However we have to be aware that the 
social structures of communities in Afghanistan are extremely heterogeneous, thus social 
systems are changing from place to place: Village or valley communities, clans, tribes and 
religiously defined communities (e.g. Sufi orders) form the most important reference points of 
political identity and action and today constitute the basis for modern forms of clientelism.  
Because of the dominance of clientelism one of the most crucial problems of the political 
reconstruction process is that Afghanistan lacks a viable civil society and political parties that 
can address, in a credible way, matters which concern Afghan people the most. Today, 
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collective action seems to be short-lived without a long-term orientation. The permanent 
conditions of war as well as the heightened insecurity emphasized the need to stick together in 
small communities that can best be described as clientelistic organized ‘survival networks’. 
The necessity for such ‘survival networks’ grew stronger as the war began to polarize 
Afghans due to ideological, sectarian and ethnic based recruitment by the political movements 
and warlords. Distrust grew to an extent that clientelism spread into almost every sphere of 
Afghan society: politics, economy, education, and even the formation of so-called civil 
society organizations as NGOs, social and cultural associations and interest groups. This is 
why ministries, NGOs or political organizations are today usually occupied by one 
clientelistic group only (AZERBAIJANI-MOGHADDAM et al. 2002). A good example is that the 
Afghan government is not dominated by the ethnic groups of Tajiks, but by the clientelistic 
network of the Panjshiris. It is true that this government also has included many non-
Panjshiris. But on looking more carefully many of these officials are in one or the other way 
related by marriage or patronage to the leading Panjshiri network. For example the Pashtun 
Taj Mohammad Wardak, the Interior Minister until January 2003, is married to a niece of the 
Panjshiri leader Yunus Qanuni, and the Minister for Culture and Information Sayyed 
Makhdom Rahin, an Arab by descent, is married to a woman from the Panjshir valley. 
 
 
3. The ethnic trap 
Regarding their endeavor to develop a peace arrangement for Afghanistan, in my opinion, the 
United Nations are caught in the ‘ethnic trap’. The media and the policy-makers, who have 
been confronted abruptly with the confusing political and military situation in Afghanistan 
since September 11, identified the Afghan conflict as an ethnic one and highlighted ethnicity 
as the most important template to analyze the conflict. Although, as I have indicated, ethnicity 
turned out to be one of the major guiding lines of the Afghan conflict, the narrowing of the 
conflict on its ethnic dimension only, excludes the fact that there are several other dimensions 
to the conflict: 
• Firstly, the relevance of ethnicity as a factor of military and political cohesion 
remained limited in the Afghan war: countless combat units and commanders such as 
Haji Qadir or Abdul Haq changed their allegiance several times out of political 
opportunism and economic incentive – independent of their ethnic affiliation. 
• Secondly, the mistake commonly made by policy-makers is to understand ethnic 
groups as uniform, constant bodies acting in accord, and to equate the ethnic group 
with the political movements, who claim to represent a certain ethnic group. What is 
ignored in the present debate is the fact that, despite the ethnicization of the war, the 
ethnicization of the Afghan masses failed.  
• Thirdly, policy-makers ignore the abovementioned limitation of utilization of ethnicity 
in the Afghan context. Ethnicity is rather a hidden driving force of the Afghan 
conflict, which is only used to a certain extent, than a general argument used in public 
speeches. 
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The crucial misunderstandings of the peace process as initiated by the United Nations at the 
Petersberg Conference were  
• that the predominance of clientelism was explained with ethnicity and both terms were 
equated and; 
• that an conflict labeled as an ‘ethnic’ one can be brought to an end by an ‘ethnic 
solution’. 
There is a broad consensus amongst policy-makers that the Afghan government should not 
only be multi-ethnic. Moreover, it should reflect the ethnic composition of the Afghan society 
accurately. The power-sharing arrangement compiled at the Petersberg Conference was based 
on the following quota of ministers: 11 Pashtuns, 8 Tajiks, 5 Hazaras, 3 Uzbeks and 3 not 
appointed. Although an ‘ethnic solution’ sounds appropriate in recognizing the interests of the 
various ethnic groups, it offers tremendous obstacles such as which ethnic groups and to what 
extend should be included. Another risk is that this ethnic solution produces frustrations if the 
ethnic quota is not recognized accurately. Also this approach ignores the constructive 
character of ethnicity and assumes that a government in which all ethnic groups are 
represented would supposedly suffice to reflect all facets of the Afghan population. A good 
example for this misunderstanding is Hamid Karzai. While the Pashtun affiliation was one of 
the strongest arguments to appoint Hamid Karzai as the president of the transition 
government, it has to consider that the elite and political leaders of the Pashtuns did not 
recognize Karzai as their representative. Thus Karzai obtains no stronghold within the 
Pashtun population.  
 
 
4. Suggestions for the design of a future government 
The following suggestions for the design of a future Afghan government strongly reject the 
politicization of ethnicity in general. While it is, of course, not to promote the idea that a 
future Afghan government should be mono-ethnic, the crucial problem derives from the fact 
to impose ethnicity to the fundament of political legitimacy. Thus the raising of ethnic 
representation will have dire consequences. Afghans will reach political and administrative 
positions regarding their ethnicity and not their qualifications, and this diametrically opposes 
the concepts of a civil, democratic society as propagated by the West. Furthermore ethnicity 
could not be neglected in the political context and would turn into the bedrock of all political 
action. This will not only stabilize an ethnic suspicion but avert that any political actor will 
enter the political arena refusing the meaning of ethnicity. Thus I will demonstrate in which 
way it seems appropriate to cope with ethnicity and what are alternative strategies to design 
new political institutions. 
 
4.1 General suggestions 
To follow my argument to diminish the influence of ethnicity on the political sphere it is 
important that a new Afghan constitution, which will be elaborated on this year, should 
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likewise keep clear of ethnic or cultural factors as much as possible. It would be devastating 
to establish Sunni Islam as the state religion, for that would shut the Shiites, Hindus and Sikhs 
out. As to language policy, Farsi – Afghanistan's lingua franca – and Pashtu should be given 
coequal status, while such languages such as Uzbeki, Turkmeni or Baluchi could be granted 
the status of additional provinces’ languages. The goal to ensure the right of individual self-
expression (sectarian, language etc.) should be aspired to. If everybody in Afghanistan has the 
right to express him/herself in cultural terms, the need for an ethnicization of politics will 
decrease. 
Of course, it would be a major failure to suppress the question of ethnicity completely. But 
the politicization of ethnicity will not surmount ethnic tensions in Afghanistan. I plead for an 
open discussion within the Afghan community about ethnic prejudices and stereotypes. It has 
to be revealed that ethnicity is created by those in power and is not the basis for dividing the 
populace in Afghanistan seriously. This discussion should be part of a reconciliation process. 
It should be enforced to disenchant the myths of ethnic hatred and of ethnic stereotypes. It has 
to be demonstrated that members of different ethnic groups have lived together peacefully in 
the past. Also it has made clear that there is nothing wrong in identifying with an ethnic 
group: It is legitimate to identify oneself as a Pashtun, a Tajik etc. Thus an ethnic 
reconciliation should not try to diminish or destroy ethnic identities. 
 
4.2 Territorialization of power 
The question of how to position the new state on the axis between centralization and 
decentralization is also of the greatest relevance. The actual fragmentation of Afghanistan in 
myriads of fiefdoms ruled by various warlords or local leaders makes clear that today’s 
Afghanistan is far from establishing a strong central government. Thus the transitional 
government can be characterized as the ‘city council of Kabul’. It’s authority hardly exceeds 
the boundaries of the capital. Against this background, even if the establishment of a strong 
central government could be envisaged, it would not only take generations to achieve this 
goal, but would immediately lead into another round of violent conflicts and might lure the 
country into endemic chaos. Also it has to be kept in mind that centrifugal forces have always 
stood in the way of centralizing state-building processes. Even more it can hardly be assumed 
that a strong central government could cope in a contenting way with the political, social and 
cultural diversity of the country and that one single homogeneous political and legal system 
can cover whole Afghanistan.  
There has been much discussion of establishing an ethnic federalism as a way of doing justice 
to ethnic demands. But that approach could prove counterproductive, since no province in 
Afghanistan is ethnically homogenous and the various population groups are very difficult to 
site geographically. Often enough there are villages and valleys in which members of 
different ethnic groups reside. The introduction of an ethno-federalism entails often enough 
that on the level of the constituent states, the practice of ethnocratic intolerance by 
representatives of titular ethnic groups quickly becomes rooted. Ideas of ethnic 
homogenization could easily be projected onto the territory as highlighted by the example of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and ‘ethnic cleansing’ will occur as a political practice. The expulsion 
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and arbitrary atrocities against Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan since Winter 2001/2 are 
alarming signs of an ethnic cleansing process. Another consequence is that for minority elites, 
either shifting provincial boundaries or founding a new province of their own becomes more 
attractive. Political instability becomes endemic. Against this background the suggestion to 
separate Afghanistan into a northern, Tajik-Uzbek zone and a southern Pashtun one or to 
breakup Afghanistan and to include its regions into the neighboring countries does not only 
seem naïve but highly dangerous. Furthermore it has to consider that the introduction of 
ethno-federalism would entail a new gerrymandering of the constituent states. Here with 
established identities, which could be used for the political reconstruction process would be 
destroyed. For the ordinary population the provinces, which were established in 1964, have 
been raised to major references of identity within the last few years. When I visited Kabul 
1997 it was usual to identify one’s personal origin by stating the name of the province and not 
by stating the ethnic or tribal origin. 
Instead of ethno-federalism, discussions concerning the creation of a federal state in 
Afghanistan, in which the exceptionally strong tradition of local autonomy and self-
government can proceed, are very promising. The Indian or Swiss model, where the federal 
entities are not exclusively or primarily defined in ethnic terms, and where they enjoy strong 
provincial or local autonomy, might serve as a model. Regarding the case of Afghanistan the 
once established provinces and districts should remain the territorial basis of the 
administration of this federal system. Certain of these administrative units could receive 
autonomy in legal, lingual, religious or cultural spheres. For example local, customary law 
plays an important role in many parts of the country, as do religious notables in the judiciary 
process. It would certainly be alienating for large sections of the population if judicial reform 
were to impose a unified code for the entire country and block access to justice through non-
state channels such as religious courts. It is therefore certainly sensible to allow for a certain 
degree of legal pluralism, perhaps comparable to the practice that has developed in Indonesia. 
However, it would seriously undermine the project of modern statehood and the establishment 
of basic principles of equality and protection from arbitrary violence if courts of appeal were 
not organised on the basis of one and the same legal corpus in the entire country, a corpus that 
was compatible with sharia on the one hand and fundamental human rights on the other hand. 
However, any form of federalism in the Afghan context may imply the perpetuation of the 
rule of regional warlords, who are amongst the very few in the current debate about the future 
Afghan state who advocate a decentralised mode of government. And indeed, capture of 
regional state structures by warlords and other regional bosses represents a danger for an 
integrated Afghan state. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that warlords cannot 
be transformed into provincial governors, as was the case in other regions of the world, 
including Europe, in comparable phases of state-building processes.  
 
4.3 Administration 
The introduction of a system of ethnic representation, in which fixed quotas determine how 
many representatives each ethnic group will have at the center of power, could have negative 
consequences for Afghanistan. Research indicates that such regimes mainly work in a 
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sustainable fashion in highly developed states with a strong capacity for redistribution, as well 
as an established political culture of compromise. 
An ethno-religious quota system of the sort that many have in mind at the moment would tend 
rather to increase conflict than to reduce it. Against that background the setting of ethnic 
quotas for government posts harbors the danger of permanently fixing the importance of 
ethnicity, thus setting the stage for a juggling of numbers at the filling of every official 
position. A study recently undertaken by a Pashtun NGO (Wak Foundation for Afghanistan 
1999) summarized that 62,63% are Pashtuns. In contrast Abdullah Abdullah, who was 
appointed as foreign minister of the transition government at the Bonn talks, countered that 
Pastuns are only 38% of the Afghan people. The road into a war of numbers is prognosticated. 
Thus, if a government is based on ethnicity, then criteria on how these ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan should be shaped, must be fixed. In a second step a census must be carried out to 
fix the size of the ethnic groups. Afghans who ignore ethnicity are encouraged to affiliate with 
one of the official recognized ethnic groups. Regarding the fact that often enough the ethnic 
identity, individuals are choosing, depends on the social context, this quota will be turn out to 
be unstable. Furthermore this census will face the problem of how to cope with Afghans who 
belong to non-recognized ethnic groups. Ethnicity will emerge as an insurmountable criterion 
in Afghan politics.  
Furthermore ethnic leaders claim not only a certain share of ministers in the transition 
government in the name of a certain ethnic group, but also specific core positions. That the 
core ministries of foreign affairs, interior affairs and defense were all delivered to the 
Panjshiris on the Petersberg Agreement fostered suspicions. Rashid Dostum claims one of 
these ministries for the Uzbeks, while many Afghans support the idea that each of the core 
ministries should be hold by a politician from a certain ethnic group. To balance these ethnic 
claims seems quite impossible. Lastly, a problem arises from the existence of the bunch of 
minor ethnic groups. The Aimaq, Qizilbash, Baluchs, Nuristani, Turkmen, Pashai, Sikhs or 
Hindus are significant ethnic groups in Afghanistan, which while not numerous, are 
politically and economically influential. In an ‘ethnic solution’ they will claim a political 
representation in the central as well as in the provincial governments sooner or later. How 
should these ethnic demands be satisfied? 
In full contrast to the ‘ethnic solution’ I emphasize that the qualification for a position in the 
Afghan government should be determined by professional competence and not by ethnic 
affiliation. Of course it is impossible to exclude ethnicity from the compilation of the 
government at all. But the significant question is, should ethnicity be installed as the basis of 
the government or as a criteria of subordinated importance, as favored in this approach? The 
solution is not a rigid ethnic quota system, but care must be taken to insure ethnic balance in 
staffing the government at all levels in an informal way. 
 
4.4 Democracy 
The establishing of a multi-party system on civil and not on ethnic basis is the most important 
aim in ensuring an enduring peace in Afghanistan. However the political and social-structural 
preconditions for democratic development in Afghanistan are rather unfavorable. 
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Democratization in conditions of weak civil societies and weak institutional capacity for 
conflict resolution can lead to a sharpening and escalation of conflict. As already mentioned, 
Afghanistan has no civil society tradition and hardly any experience of democratic control of 
government. If the center of political power in Kabul is now acquiring importance thanks to 
international legitimacy and support of it, control of this center will assume existential 
significance. Elections produce losers and may lead to their permanent exclusion from power 
if institutional mechanisms for distributing and dissolving power are not established at the 
same time. The struggle for success at the ballot box becomes a struggle for political and 
material survival, and means of winning are chosen accordingly.  
The fact that democratic government is carried out ‘in the name of the people’ also has the 
effect of politicizing ethnic differences. Defining the boundaries and character of ‘the people’ 
becomes increasingly significant, so that the struggle for power is frequently perceived as a 
conflict between ethno-religiously defined groups, whose leaders are now presenting 
themselves as the representatives of ‘their people’ in order to seize the greatest possible share 
of power at the center. The ethnicization of politics may lead to constellations of conflict that 
are difficult to resolve through negotiation and compromise. Now we can already consider 
that political actors such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdurlrab Rasul Sayyaf, who have 
been sidelined in the last two rounds of government formation and who represent extreme 
political opinions, are the most effective and successful ones in establishing political parties. 
In this context it is to suggest that elections in 18 months is too early for establishing a stable 
democratic system. A democracy can only release the potential for political integration 
following successful political stabilization and institutional consolidation. To this end, it 
should proceed within institutional frameworks that are capable of countering the danger of 
ethno-religious conflicts over distributional issues. In the medium term, more realistic than 
holding democratic elections would be the institutionalization of the traditional system of 
consensus-building between notables, bureaucrats and tribal leaders combined with the 
careful democratization of its principles of recruitment. In this respect the loya jirga 
represents a suitable body, provided that actual power relations are sufficiently taken into 
account – that is, provided the dominant clientelistic groups are adequately represented, at 
least in the period of transition. The emergency loya jirga that convened in June 2002 
endeavored to include elected representatives as well as the ruling clientelistic groups and 
warlords. Although many Afghans have been disappointed by the proceedings and the results 
of the loya jirga, it at least helped to stabilize the fragile political situation. Thus for 
Afghanistan, democracy represents a long-term project. As with other processes of political 




In Afghanistan, the international community is once again faced with the challenge of dealing 
with a conflict that is interpreted as an ethnic one. The architects of a future Afghanistan 
would be well advised to work against the ethnic polarization of the country. In this paper I 
have tried to demonstrate that ethnicity is neither the cause of Afghan conflict nor a natural 
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constant of human being: Ethnic groups have been created or furnished with cultural 
substance mainly by Western anthropologists. While ethnicity was not a domineering political 
factor in pre-war Afghanistan it emerged as a main source of political and military 
mobilization especially since 1992. Hence acceding to ethnic demands will only strengthen 
those who – as has happened before on the Balkans – use ethnicity as an instrument for 
promoting their own interests, but will not contribute toward the resolving of the Afghan 
conflict. Hence I suggest that the international power brokers in Afghanistan should consider 
ethnicity merely in an informal way in power-sharing arrangements, and should not stress 
ethnicity as the fundament of political decision-making processes. The major challenge of a 
suitable and sound peace process in Afghanistan is the question how to cope with the 
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